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The paper examines the role of trade patterns in the entry and exit decisions 
of firms and tests the existence of symmetry between entry and exit factors. 
Trade patterns were found, through their entry and exit impact, to affect the 
structure of Greek industry rather unfavourably. Prospects seem to be bleaker 
within the integrated European market of the 1990s. The lack of symmetry 
leads to increasing concentration. The gloomy outlook is improved by the 
strong stand of existing, competitive firms. 
I Introduction 
Firm entry and exit are important determinants of market structure and, 
consequently, of the growth and welfare of an economy. Therefore, it is 
interesting to uncover the specific factors that influence these determi- 
nants as well as the way that they do so. Such factors are usually classified 
under two headings: entry (exit) promotion and barriers discouraging 
movement. 
It has been argued in the literature that there exists a symmetrical rela- 
tionship between entry and exit barriers (Caves and Porter, 1976; Eaton 
and Lipsey, 1980,1981). The argument is based on the understanding that 
every barrier to entry can, simultaneously, be seen as a barrier to exit. 
Investment in product-specific assets from machinery to  marketing and 
advertising is thought of as a sunk cost, since it has limited, or no other, 
value if the specific production for which it has been bought stops. The 
higher the sunk costs the more effectively entry is deterred. On the other 
hand, once investments are made, the incentive to leave the sector is 
reduced and the higher the sunk costs paid out. In the sense of investment 
specificity, barriers to entry are simultaneously barriers to exit. Other 
structural barriers, such as concentration, may affect exit in the same way 
they affect entry. The more concentrated the market the higher the 
expected collusion and thus the more hesitant are entrants. At  the same 
time firms must feel more protected in a concentrated market and thus 
feel less willing to leave it. 
O Edward Arnold 1995 
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V. Anagnostaki and H. Louri 87 
The purpose of this paper is to test the existence of such a symmetry in 
Greek manufacturing industry in the 1982-88 period. In addition to the 
usual barriers and the other entry and exit enhancing factors, the effect of 
trade patterns on entry and exit will be examined. With the European 
Market integrated and all the national frontiers abolished from 1/1/93 the 
effect of import and export penetration on the decision to enter or to leave 
a sector requires more attention. Does import penetration deter entry or 
encourage exit? Does export orientation of a sector attract entry and dis- 
courage exit? Are these effects significant? If they are, the abolishment of 
the frontiers with the ease of foreign penetration it brings, will seriously 
affect the structure of Greek industry. 
Before ending the introduction, some descriptive statistics should be dis- 
closed. The entry rate of Greek manufacturing firms in the 1982-88 period 
is 7.71% and the exit rate is 6.85%, i.e. for every 100 existing firms 7.7 new 
ones were entering, while 6.9 old ones were leaving their sectors. The 
correlation between the two rates is 0.25, while the correlation between 
the numbers of entering and exiting firms is 0.72. Entry and exit are 
highly correlated, as expected, since they are both affected by the same 
factors. 
The paper includes three more sections. Section II describes the model 
and the variables to be used, Section 111 presents the regression results and 
Section IV draws the conclusions. 
I1 Model and data 
Entry, EN, is usually modelled as a function of the difference between 
expected, ll, and entry forestalling profits, n* (Orr, 1974; Geroski, 1991a). 
The entry forestalling profits depend on the height of the entry barriers 
which incumbent firms can erect against new competitors. Thus, n* 
depends in turn on capital requirements and barriers, such as excess capac- 
ity (Hilke, 19W, Lieberman, 1987), advertising and R&D expenses 
(Kessides, 1986,1991), the degree of concentration (Schwalbach, 1991) the 
business or market risk (Schwalbach, 1987) etc. Other factors such as 
labour market characteristics (Storey and Jones, 1987; Shapiro and 
Khemani, 1987), expected growth and size of a sector (Baldwin and 
Gorecki, 1987; Acs and Audretsch, 1989), the extent of multi-plant opera- 
tions (Duetsch, 1984a), the nationality of entrants (Geroski, 1991b) and 
incumbents (Khemani and Shapiro, 1986) have been found to be signifi- 
cant determinants of entry. 
where E includes all other variables affecting entry and 
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88 Entry and exit from Greek manufacturing industry 
By substituting (2) into (1) and specifying some of the factors known to be 
included in E 
EN = yo + a l n  - yIKR - y2AD - y,CR - y,BR + y,SI 
+ y,GR + y,LA + ?,IMP + y,EP + el (3) 
where el includes all unknown factors, KR is capital requirements, AD is 
advertising expenses, CR is the degree of concentration, BR is business 
risk, SI is size, GR is the growth rate, LA is the relative cost of labour, 
IMP and E P  are import and export penetration respectively. 
Exit, EX, is less well studied in theory and practice (Macdonald, 1986; 
Mayer and Chappel, 1992). Following the work of Dunne er al. (1988), 
Badden-Fuller (1989), Londgran (1990), Lieberman (1990), Schary (1991), 
Baldwin and Corecki (1991), exit depends negatively on expected profits, 
industry size, barriers to exit erected by sunk costs, and all other barriers 
and variables affecting entry according to the symmetry hypothesis as 
examined by Shapiro and Khemani (1987) and Duetsch (1984b), Thus 
EX = So + a 2 n  - 8,KR - S A D  - 6,CR - S4BR + 6,SI 
+ 8 6GR + 8,LA + S,IMP + 8,EP + e, (4) 
where e, includes all unknown factors affecting exit. 
In order to estimate (3) and (4) annual data referring to gross entry and 
exit numbers from the 20 Zdigit Greek manufacturing sectors during the 
1982-88 period were used'. Such data are found in the annual surveys of 
Greek industry published by the Statistical Service of the Confederation of 
Greek Industries (CGI) and refer to large-size firms2. 120 observations were 
available. Information on the independent variables was obtained either 
from the same source (n, KR, BR, SI) or special editions of the Greek 
National Statistical Service (AD, CR, GR, LA). Finally, data on EP  and IMP 
were acquired from the former source and the Bank of Greece respectively. 
More specifically, EN, is the ratio of the number of entrants over the 
number of existing firms, while EX is the respective ratio of exiters. n is 
expected profits formulated according to lagged expectation$. Other 
I Information on entry and exit is available only at the 2-digit level for Greek manufacturing 
industry. Most papers on entry use 3- or Cdigit data, which provide better information. 
Using such aggregate data hides part of intra-industry differences, which could be important 
and so provide less sensitive results. 
The Statistical Service of the CGI collects its data from the balance sheets of corporations. 
It includes up to 3500 firms annual accounting for about 90% of total assets in Greek manu- 
facturing industry. The firms taken into account are large and the information available on 
entry refers to absolute numbers and total assets. Unfortunately, information on exit refers 
only to numbers. Thus, no size proxy for exiting firms was available for our estimations. 
Therefore only the numbers of entering and exiting firms were used. 
Expected profits in the entry equation are proxied by the ratio of average gross profits of 
each sector over average gross profits of the manufacturing industry, both lagged by one 
year. Expected profits in the exit equation are proxied by the log of gross profits lagged by 
one year. Other types of expectations, such as adaptive, static and rational with perfect fore- 
sight, were used but they gave inferior results. 
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V. Anagnostaki and H. Louri 89 
forms of expectations were used but they produced inferior results. Data 
on capital are not available4, thus productivity was used as a proxy for KR, 
in the sense that productivity is positively and closely associated with capi- 
tal endowments. Productivity is the ratio of value added in each sector to 
the number of respective employees. 
A D  is the ratio of advertising expenses over sales and CR is the four 
largest firms concentration ratio in terms of employment, BR is the stan- 
dard deviation of profitability in the last four years divided by the average 
profitability in the same period. Profitability is the ratio of gross profits to 
total (own and borrowed) capital. SI is the share of production value of 
each sector over the industry total and GR is the annual growth rate of 
employment. The growth rate of total assets, as well as the growth rate of 
sales, were used but they were not found to be significant. Such growth 
rates may also suffer from inflation problems, which is not the case with 
employment. LA is the ratio of the average wages in each sector over the 
average wage of industry. IMP is the ratio of each sector's imports over 
relevant domestic demand as estimated by the Bank of Greece and EP is 
the value of exports over sales. 
In Empirical findings 
1 Entry regressions' 
As can be seen from Table 1 only eight of the ten independent variables 
are reported in the estimations. Two, namely capital requirements and 
business risk are not included because they were insignificant in all cases. 
The best fit was achieved by the semi-log specification versus the linear 
one, judging by Sargan's criterion which was 1.39 and 1.42 for the entry 
and the exit equation respectively5. 
In the first two columns are the regression results for the whole period 
1982-88. In 1985 an austerity programme was introduced by the govern- 
ment which affected Greek firms. Thus, in order to test the stability of the 
coefficients before and after the austerity programme the equations are 
estimated separately for the 1982-85 and 1986-88 periods. The results are 
presented in the last four columns and a Chow test is performed which 
'Data on capital collected and published by the CGI are taken from the balance sheets of 
corporations and refer to capital at historic cost, i.e. at the price of its acquisition. They can- 
not be transferred to constant prices and therefore, they cannot be used in any econometric 
analysis. 
' Sargan (1964) has suggested a maximum likelihood ratio test for choosing between alterna- 
tive functional forms. The standard errors of the alternative forms must be compared and 
the one giving the relatively smaller error must be chosen. In order to compare the standard 
errors of a linear (SE) and a log (se) form, they should be expressed in comparable units. 
Therefore, se is multiplied with the geometric mean of the dependent variable (gm). If the 
ratio SElse.gm is less than one, the linear version is preferred and vice versa. 
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90 Entry and exit from Greek manufacturing industry 
Table 1 Entry and exit from Greek manufacturing industry 1982-88 
1982-88 1982-85 1986-88 
*t-values are reported in parentheses; coefficients with t-values > 2.35 are significant at 
1 %, >1.65 at 5% and > 1.30 at 10% (one-tail test). 
supports the stability of the coefficients despite the turbulent environment 
of the mid-80s. 
The explanatory ability of the model is satisfactory at explaining 58% 
and 57% of the variation of the changes in the entry and exit ratios respec- 
tively-a high score for such a pooled sample which compares favourably 
with results from relevant studies. Multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity 
tests were performed. Neither seemed to create any problems. The 
Goldfeld and Quandt test for heteroscedasticity (Judge et al. 1988) 
resulted in F ratios that were 1.60 for the entry and 1.45 for the exit equa- 
tion, both less than the critical values of F with 40 DOF at 5% and 1% 
which are 1.69 and 2.11 respectively6. 
Expected profits and growth were found to affect entry positively 
although not significantly in the case of growth. The size of the market 
affected entry negatively, which is the opposite of what was expected. It 
Shapiro and Khemani (1987) found a high correlation between the errors of the entry and 
exit equations and consequently they used a full information maximum likelihood method 
of estimation. In our case the correlation between e, and e, was only 0.20. Thus, it was not 
considered necessary to use a more complicated method than OLS. Data requirements 
would also be impossible to meet in any alternative case. 
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V. Anagnostaki and H. Louri 91 
seems that the larger the market the less willing firms are to enter, proba- 
bly because they consider it saturated. 
The relative wage of the sector, which is a proxy for the relative labour 
cost, influences entry negatively. This means that entrants are not willing 
to try their luck in labour expensive productions. Advertising expenses are 
a barrier to entry but not a very significant one. They are probably seen as 
a sunk cost which new firms are not willing to bear. The degree of concen- 
tration also plays a very important negative role. Apparently, high con- 
centration is thought of as an indication of possible collusion and 
predatory behaviour against entrants, increasing the uncertainty of their 
success. 
The two new variables concerning the effect of import penetration and 
export share in sales of each sector also play a significant role. Entry is 
encouraged by an increasing export share, while it is discouraged by 
increasing import penetration. This result is very important for the devel- 
opment of Greek industry in view of the abolishment of national frontiers 
within the EU and the ease of capital mobility it brings. Sectors facing 
increasing import penetration will be abandoned by prospective entrants, 
which means that production will be limited to the existing Greek 
firms and (possibly) many foreign ones. Thus, Greek manufacturing pro- 
duction might eventually shrink, at least in the highly import penetrated 
sectors. 
At the same time, the positive sign of the export share means that entry 
is directed towards sectors with export potential. Such sectors in Greece 
are mainly food and beverages, textiles, clothing and footwear, leather and 
fur. On the contrary, the import penetrated ones are high-tech goods, elec- 
tronics, machinery, cars and medical equipment. 
The estimated trade effects suggest that specialization of manufacturing 
production towards export oriented sectors and away from import pene- 
trated ones will be increased following the integration of the Greek econ- 
omy into the European market. Specialization may be a good prospect if it 
is accompanied by an increase in trade. It may be a bad one if it means 
that production will be restricted to few light, consumer oriented goods 
with low technological input (competitive only because of the lower labour 
cost) which are currently the main exported goods of Greece. In this case, 
specialization means increased trade benefits for the short run, but possi- 
bly serious structural problems for the long run when such goods will be 
more inexpensively imported in the EU by the NICs and other cheap 
labour countries. 
2 Exit regressions 
The.picture is improved-if the effects of the same variables on exit are con- 
sidered. The signs are the same, namely positive for exports and negative 
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92 Entry and exit from Greek manufacturing industry 
for imports, which means that exit is increasing with export potential and 
decreasing with import penetration. One explanation may be that since 
many firms try entry in export intensive sectors, many fail to survive and 
close down or  exit in time. Probably only the efficient and internationally 
competitive ones survive at the end. 
Exit is also decreasing with increasing import penetration, which means 
that firms established in such a highly competitive environment and spe- 
cialized in certain product niches, apparently not satisfied by imports, do 
not exit easily. Actually, the more penetrated the sector the less firms exit, 
which means that existing firms occupy a solid position in their markets. 
This result improves the picture drawn according to the entry results, since 
it means that incumbent firms are not suffering so much from increasing 
European integration except if they are inefficient to compete internation- 
ally. 
It seems that the effect of an increasingly international competitive envi- 
ronment is not as negative as the entry equation shows. After all, exit may 
balance the specialization bias which will be enhanced by entry decisions 
within a free European market. 
Exit is influenced negatively by expected profits, i.e. the higher the 
expected profits the less reasons there are for exit. The positive sign of 
growth and size comes as a surprise. The explanation of the size effect may 
be that exit is higher in larger sectors, which agrees with Shapiro and 
Khemani (1987). The positive growth effect is difficult to interpret but it 
may mean that, as with size, movement is higher in high growth sectors. 
Also, since growth refers to employment, it may mean that exit is encour- 
aged by increasing labour requirements. Large and high growth sectors 
host a lot of movement and finally displacement. 
Relative wage affects exit positively although not very significantly. It is 
not unreasonable for exit to be encouraged by high labour costs. Finally, 
concentration and advertisement are not exercising any significant effect 
on the exit decision. 
Because of the 1985 austerity programme, it was decided to test for the 
stability of the coefficients between the pre- and the post-austerity periods. 
A Chow test was performed which rejected the non-stability hypothesis. 
The resulting F ratios were 0.73 and 0.38 for the exit and the entry regres- 
sions respectively, both lower than the critical value of F with 9 and 102 
DOF at the 5% and 1%,  which are 2.00 and 2.62 respectively. 
The only striking difference in the coefficients between the two periods 
refers to the import and export variables, which are insignificant for the 
1986-88 period, probably because both imports and exports were seriously 
reduced, thus not affecting so much entry and exit decisions. Also, the 
growth effect on entry was strengthened in the 198688 period showing a 
preference for perspectives since current affairs were not flourishing. 
In view of these results, symmetry does not seem to hold for the Greek 
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V. Anagnostaki and H. Louri 93 
case7, at least not unequivocally. Most coefficients come up with opposite 
signs, except concentration which is not significant for exit. The trade pat- 
terns solely affect both entry and exit in the same way and thus are the 
only ones to support a weak symmetry hypothesis. 
Why is symmetry weak, one is tempted to ask. It seems to be the case 
that the usual entry barriers, such as capital requirements, advertising 
expenses and risk are not really significant for Greek firms in either the 
entry or exit decision. Thus, there is a symmetry in non-significance, one 
may notice, arising probably from easy bank borrowing and reduced per- 
sonal commitment pestering Greek firms. Such factors are often accused 
for frequent business failures in Green manufacturing industry. 
It may also be the case that concentration is an entry deterrent but does 
not provide any further protection to existing firms and, especially, to the 
ones established in the market fringe. Thus, it does not affect exit. Also, 
the relative labour cost may discourage entry, but once a firm is estab- 
lished in a profitable market it is not encouraged to exit because of it. 
IV Conclusions 
Entry and exit of firms are both very important for the structure of mar- 
kets. Thus, the factors influencing them deserve close attention. Such fac- 
tors are usually classified into movement enhancing ones and barriers. 
Symmetry of their effects on entry and exit is often claimed to be present. 
Two hypotheses were tested in the paper: (i) the significance of trade 
patterns for entry and exit, which is examined for the first time to our 
knowledge; and (ii) the symmetry of the factors causing firm movement in 
and out of industry. Greek manufacturing industry in 1982-88 provided 
the sample. 
Import penetration and the share of exports in sales were found to be 
very significant determinants of both entry and exit. Such an effect will be 
enhanced by the integrated market of the European Union, which offi- 
cially started on 1/1/93 and may result in a specialization of manufacturing 
production not favourable for the Greek economy. The negative impact of 
trade patterns on entry seems to be impaired by the respective effects of 
exit, which are encouraging. 
Symmetry between entry and exit causing factors does not seem to hold 
for the Greek manufacturing industry. With the exception of import pene- 
tration, which discourages entry and exit and export share, which encour- 
ages both of them, the other determinants either do not affect firm 
movement at all or, if they do, it is in opposite ways. Consequently, factors 
It should be noticed that even in the other studies where entry and exit equations are esti- 
mated (MacDonald, 1986; Shapiro and Khemani, 1987; Mayer and Chappel, 1992) the sym- 
metry effects are rather weak and the symmetry hypothesis receives only 'qualified' support. 
. .. 
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94 Entry and exit from Greek manufacturing industry 
discouraging entry and promoting exit cause heavier concentration than 
otherwise. 
The implications of the paper, according to the evidence collected and 
the model used, is that the factors affecting entry and exit in Greek manu- 
facturing industry may result in heavier concentration and foreign domina- 
tion within the enlarged and integrated European market of the late 1990s. 
Only the resistance of existing competitive firms seems able to reduce such 
a threat. 
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